11/07/2007

News / Africa: defence expenditure and arms trafficking in the sub Sahara

Linked from: http://uk.equilibri.net/article/8123/Africa__defence_expenditure_and_arms_trafficking_in_the_sub_Sahara

Written by: Alberto Grossetti

The international arms market: between control and illegality

The triennial campaign initiated by Control Arms, promoted to the international level by Oxfam International, Amnesty International and IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) to awaken public opinion and request a global government commitment on the issue of arms trafficking, obtained a concrete result last December: the UN General Assembly (GA) initiated work on an international treaty for the control of arms sales, approving the resolution with 153 votes in favour, one against, and 24 abstentions. In June, two regional organizations expressed support of the treaty's proposal. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Council of the European Union publicly declared their support for measures to establish the necessary regulations for a more responsible global arms market. Denied the possibility of entering foreign markets, many states wouldn't be able to satisfy legitimate defence and security needs, thus becoming importers of arms and war materials. In 2006 global arms spending was estimated at 1.158 million dollars (approximately 15 times the annual spending for international aid), thus far the largest sum after the end of the Cold War.

Region 1989 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Africa (13.1) 10.6 11.1 10.3 12.3 13.2 14.4 14.0 14.8 15.3 (15.5)
America 521 438 397 375 368 387 431 481 522 549 575
Asia & Oceanic 106 121 124 131 136 146 153 160 167 176 185
Europe 497 314 282 283 280 287 294 302 306 309 310
Middle East 39.1 45.0 41.4 46.1 48.9 58.4 55.9 58.0 62.8 70.5 72.5
World 1176 928 855 844 844 892 948 1016 1072 1119 1158

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, figures in millions of USA dollars

Arms and war materials have become ordinary merchandise in the global market, and informal markets have developed alongside those fed by state governments: the increase in formal spending caused the enlargement of the international market and, according to several analysts, greater possibilities of illegal trafficking. The presence of subtle lines of distinction between formal and informal trade has been evidenced by a study by the Institute of International Studies of Geneva: officially registered arms possessed by the armed forces and by police authorities total 17,238,615, but the actual number in global circulation amounts to more than 226 million. The arms industry has pursued product specialization, and in fact the greater part of all final products consists of internal components sourced abroad. In addition to military utility, many of these components can be used for civil purposes and technological development: digital systems and microprocessors of Hellfire missiles and Apache Longbow helicopters, in fact, are also used in DVD readers, cellular telephones and TV satellite systems. Studies confirm the tendency of many governments not to import finished products directly, but only their parts, which are then assembled within the home country. This can have positive consequences in terms of the acquisition of technological know-how and job creation, however it also offers illegal markets greater opportunities to evade control because the dual utility of certain components makes identifying their ultimate use difficult.
The consequences of armed violence

The effects of the unsupervised proliferation of military materials vary according to geographical region and political context, referentially economic and social, but which may equally delineate general tendencies. Usually represented by international organizations (UN, World Bank, NGOs), such tendencies have evidenced the close relationship between illegal arms trafficking, the duration of conflict and disastrous socio-economic consequences. Armed conflicts, the diffusion of armed violence, and connected criminal activities beyond having a microeconomic impact (extortion, difficulty initiating and strengthening economic activity, informal economic development), are also relevant at the macro level: the socio-political climate seems decisive, in fact, in attracting foreign investments, tourism and the faith of international financial institutions. The financial weight of armed violence requires an increase in the appropriation for security and health assistance, thus reducing the resources for post-war development and reconstruction programs: according to Paul Collier, World Bank economist, civil war in a poor country costs approximately 50 billion US dollars a year while agricultural production net losses caused by armed violence in Africa between 1970 and 1997 are estimated at 25 billion dollars, equal to three quarters of all development aid during the same period. IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) investigations report that the budget for sanitary spending in Uganda is anticipated at 77 dollars per head annually, while the cost of treatment of a firearms wound averages 284. In the region of Bahr-el-Gazaal in Sudan, after 22 years of civil war, demographic inquiries have revealed that the working-age female population has doubled in respect to that of males, causing a considerable decrease in the total workforce. Consequently, a society is established in which poverty is contemporarily cause and effect of a social situation characterized by violence and a criminal economy that impoverishes state finances.
The arms market treaty

Arms slip quickly from the realm of legality to illegality. Whereas, during the Cold War, the two powers controlled their flow, now war materials travel from one civil war to another, profiting from government collusion and the absence of international controls. Attempts at regulation have proven to be ineffective. The last effort, in 2006, was a legally binding agreement reached by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) determined to control the illegal trafficking which further destabilizes the region. Today IANSA reports:

Of the 13 embargos implemented by the UN in the past decade, not one has been respected.
There are no international guidelines that direct states in the regulation of arms possession among their citizens.
There is no legally binding treaty controlling intermediary arms activity.
There is no legal obligation to maintain an archive binding arms to a site (whether military deposits, police resources, or of common residences), just as there are no constraints encouraging government cooperation among countries to track the arms used for crime and war.


For those who promote the international campaign, the future arms market treaty will be truly effective if, accompanied by a few key principles (state responsibility, explicit controls of use and probable use, transparency, transport controls), it achieves global cooperation and jurisdictional uniformity from each country. In fact, strong controls on international transporting could be weakened by permissive arms laws within each country and vice versa.
Recent trends in African spending

According to SIPRI data, military spending in Africa witnessed an increase of about 50% in the period between 1996 and 2001, rising from 10 to 15.5 billion dollars. This outcome is principally ascribed to the 4 north African countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia which, together with Nigeria and South Africa, constitute about half of the increase. Despite the difficulty of obtaining reliable data, on account of the lack of a common accounting language (certain countries don't consider the wages paid to the forces of law and order to be military spending) and negligible transparency in the drafting of state balances, one can rule out the presence of a common continental trend and affirm that the sum of military spending directly affects its impact which varies according to the country and its internal vicissitudes. Some common tendencies, however, on which the majority of analysts concur, seem to emerge in all the empirical analyses.

Africa invests less in defence in respect to global standards, and spending relies on political, security and economic conditions.
Security requirements are the principle motive of spending. For several countries, like South Africa, security policies assume a regional meaning through support to the African Union (UA) missions.
The link between military spending and economic growth and human development is not absolute. It can lead to positive and negative effects that vary from country to country.
Case study: Ethiopia

In 2003 Ethiopia had the second highest number of soldiers on the African continent after Egypt, and is still among the countries with the highest military spending. With the end of the war with Eritrea (1998-2000) both the armed forces and the military budget were significantly restructured. Charting the official data of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we notice that as spending reduces as the principle motive of military engagement, its impact on the state budget and on the PIL is diminished respectively from 39% and 13% in 2000 to 11.4% and 4.1% in 2003. The costs of war were considerable for a country dependent on international aid: the border war cost nearly 300 million dollars, necessitating the adoption of extra measures. To finance military activity, the Ethiopian government utilized a part of the entry derivatives from the privatization of state companies, imposed an additional tax of 10% on certain imported products and cut funds designated for infrastructure reconstruction. Furthermore, the war worsened the food crisis by reducing the agricultural workforce and collecting funding from high salaries in the military sector that surpassed 30 dollars a month, a considerable figure considering that the PIL per capita in 2000 was 130 dollars.

The Ethiopian government was, in recent years, praised for having overseen, with the reduction of military spending, an increase in funding aimed at the battle against poverty and at economic development. Thanks to their commitment, and to the alliance with the USA, the country was able to benefit from greater external aid from the financial institutions IMF and World Bank (WB). International donors expect further decreases in spending, still too high and no longer necessary after the end of the war with Eritrea. In the February 2004 annual report by the PRSP, the government announced their desire to bring the incidence of military spending on the PIL to a lesser percentage of 3.6%, reaching 3% by 2006. According to various analysts, the spending trend cannot be deemed stable considering the critical state of the situation in the region, which is characterized by prolonged tensions with Eritrea and Somalia, the primary addressees of illegal arms trafficking.
Case study: Tanzania

Compared to other countries in the zone, Tanzania's military spending appears modest. In fact, in spite of the territorial proximity to the Great Lakes region, negatively distinguished for a chronically conflicted and unstable political environment, from 2000 onward defence spending and the quantity of military personnel and heavy armaments have declined. The reduction of military capabilities is a direct result of the objectives outlined in 2000, in agreement with the IMF, through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The document established the priority of certain sectors considered to be of primary importance, to which was rationed a greater allocation of state resources. In 1997 military and security spending constituted 1.35% of the PIL, 1.09% in 2002, and in 2006 it was less consequential at 1%. During the same period, funds designated for sanitation, education and water recorded an increase from 3.4% to 5.3% of the PIL. Such policies, however, deterred attention from concrete necessities in sectors focused on defence (army, but also local police) leading to the accumulation of back payments. According to various analysts, neglect of a sector as crucial as defence (military spending is not recorded in the Public Expenditure Review, PER, supervised by the WB and concentrated only in priority sectors) contributed to the rise in transparency problems that afflict the processes of public, and particularly, military spending. An example, in 2001, was the acquisition of a sophisticated air traffic control system from the English company BAE Systems, labelled by the WB "a complete waste of money" and whose financing is under investigation by Tanzania and the British Serious Fraud Office.

Tanzania occupies a strategic position connected to the southern, central and eastern African countries. According to several reports, there are strong indications confirming the link between the question of arms in the Great Lakes region and the illegal activity in Tanzania. Such affirmation (from 2001) is still valid today, recognized by the Tanzanian government engaged in the fight against illegal arms trafficking and in agreement with the other members of the East African Community (EAC). Data regarding the quantity of arms in circulation within the country aren't reliable, so consequently in September 2006 the government arranged to provide for the registration of all current legal light arms. The shared opinion is that the illegal arms market is the work of rebel groups involved in regional conflicts and of representatives of security forces that profit from the absence of controls.
Case study: Nigeria

In 2005 military spending rose 14% following the Lagos government's acquisition of 12 combat planes from China. International analysts, however, maintain that the principal reason for the increase is the fight against criminal bands operating in the Niger delta. The government engaged the armed forces even in the protection of workers and oil plants, the principal targets of rebel groups. Despite recent increases, the percentage of military spending in the PIL never exceeded 2% in the last decade and now remains under 1%. Nigeria is contemporaneously a consumer and producer of arms by way of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). This activity reached a period of maximum productivity during the civil war (1967-1970) but in 1972 was declared bankrupt. The Nigerian government, following South African and Russian interest, expressed its desire to restore DICON activities to achieve, by September 2008, self-sufficiency in munitions and light arms materials. Such an objective would allow the country to align itself with South Africa as a producer and exporter of arms and, according to observers close to the current leadership, to favour the internal economy, occupation and improvement of the trade budget. Supporting hypotheses regarding the positive aspects of military spending is a study by Lagos University in which is empirically evidenced how the growth of defence spending is accompanied by, and in greater proportion, the growth of funds intended for education. This demonstrates less the existence of a positive association between military spending and development than the absence of a necessarily negative relationship between the two factors; a theory, however, sustained by many observers and NGOs. From the situation in Nigeria, one can infer that the principle factors weighing against the country's socio-economic development are crime and a sense of insecurity, closely connected to illegal arms trafficking. Military spending may contribute to the intensification of the problem if used to inspect theft and collusion in criminal environments, but the primary cause may be corruption within the military sector and not the increase in defence spending.
Case study: Sudan

An example of the failure of the international community regarding the control of illegal arms proliferation is evinced in the drama of Darfur. Sudan is considered an enemy by the USA, the latter proposing a full embargo against Khartoum and yet not finding a strong ally in the UN, whose Security Council considers the presence of China and Russia. Sudan proves to be the principal suspect for having sold illegal arms to Khartoum, violating UN 2004 resolutions 1556 and 1564 and the blockade on armament consignment. Amnesty International has affirmed that in 2005 Sudan imported from China military equipment, arms and munitions, helicopters and planes for some tens of millions of euros and from Russia military planes and helicopters for a total value of nearly 25.5 million euros. All of this was documented with photographic proof showing said armaments engaged in attacks in Darfur. China and Russia aren't, however, the only suppliers: UN revelations affirmed that between 2000 and 2001 in Sudan, France sold a large quantity of bombs, grenades and munitions, but the list of the primary countries exporting military material consists also of England, Iran, Lithuania and Ukraine. In 2005, the Security Council reinforced the embargo to also include the government, whereas initially it prohibited exclusively war material sales to guerrilla groups, failing to consider that the Janjaweed militia were, and remain, politically and financially supported by Khartoum. It is the position of the Sudanese government in Darfur to continue practices utilized during the civil war: use of air forces against civil objectives, systematic human rights violations and war practices, utilization of illegal arms markets to supply the Janjaweed militia, which are responsible for war crimes and whose leaders remain unpunished.

Parallel to the increase in petrol earnings, Khartoum has increased resources for military activities, in wage increments, but above all, in terms of the acquisition of armaments and war technology. Considering the European Commission's Country Strategy Paper on Sudan 2002-2007, security spending constitutes a preponderant part of federal resources while social spending is delegated to local authorities that, however, don't benefit from sufficient transfers from the central government. In addition, according to data by the Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, military spending from 2001 to 2003 increased from 581 million dollars to 700 million, and considering the governing budget of 1.6 billion, concludes that Sudan spent nearly half of the annual federal revenue on defence and armament.
Conclusion

Mid-October, Oxfam International published the results of a study, conducted alongside two other NGOs (Safeworld and IANSA), on international arms trafficking and the economic costs of conflict. In fact, it was the first time that a study attempted to quantify the economic detriment caused by conflicts to African countries from 1990 to 2005. In general, the experience of sub-Saharan African countries testifies to the lack of an absolute and valid correlation, whether positive or negative, between defence spending increases and socio-economic evolution. The vastness and the heterogeneous composition of the region make elaboration of common trends difficult. Ultimately, one can affirm that the consequences derive less from defence spending increases specifically than from the state's use of its own military resources.


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